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SOURCE: Tomassini et al. Hawks and Doves on 
small-world networks. Physical Review E (2006) vol. 
73 (1) pp. 016132
able to propagate !having a gain exactly equal to that of their
neighboring doves". The system is thus found locked in a
configuration of a very high proportion of doves with a sig-
nificant number of isolated hawks.
If r!0, lone hawks always have a higher payoff than the
doves in their surroundings and will thus infect one of their
neighbors with its strategy. However for 0"r#0.1, once the
pair of hawks is established, their payoff is lower than the
one of any of the doves connected to either one them. Even
a dove that interacts with both hawks has an average payoff
still greater than what a hawk composing the pair receives.
Consequently, when 0"r#0.1, clusters of hawks first start
by either disappearing or reducing to single hawks, as previ-
ously explained for the r=0 case, but then these lone hawks
will become pairs of hawks. If the updates are done synchro-
nously, a pair of hawks will either vanish or reduce back to a
single hawk. One can clearly see that in the long run, hawks
will become extinct. Now if the update are done asynchro-
nously, a pair cannot totally disappear because only one
player is updated at a time. However, this mechanism of a
pair reducing to a single hawk and turning back into a pair
again will cause the small groups of two hawks to move
across the network and “collide” with each other, forming
larger groups that reduce back to a single-pair hawk forma-
tion. Therefore, after a large number of time steps, only a
very few hawks will survive.
If we take another look at Figs. 1 and 2, we note that
when the population of players is constrained to a latticelike
structure, the proportion of doves is reduced to zero for val-
ues of the gain-to-cost ratio greater than or equal to #0.8,
whereas this not the case when the topology is a random
graph. Let us try to give a qualitative explanation of the two
different behaviors. The first thing to be pointed out is that,
in the case of the replicators dynamics, if a dove is sur-
rounded by eight hawk neighbors, it is condemned to die for
values of r! 79 , whatever the topology may be. However, this
does not explain why for these same values, doves no longer
exist on square lattices or small worlds but are able to sur-
vive on random graphs. If the population were mixing, r
=0.8 would induce a proportion of doves equal to 20%.
Therefore, let us suppose that at a certain time step, there is
approximately 20% of doves in our population. Furthermore,
as pointed out by Hauert and Doebeli $6%, in the Hawk-Dove
game on lattices, the doves are usually spread out and form
many small isolated patches. Thus, we will also suppose
20% of doves in the population implies that in a set of play-
ers comprising an individual and its immediate eight neigh-
bors, there are about two doves. Hence, a D-player has on
average one dove and seven hawks in its neighborhood. In
the lattice network, this pair of doves can be linked in two
different manners !see Fig. 8", having either two or four
common neighbors, thus, an average of three.
More generally, if we denote $ the clustering coefficient
of the graph and k¯ the average degree, a pair of doves will
have on average $!k¯−1" common neighbors. Let us denote x
one of the two doves composing the pair as Hx, a hawk
linked to x but not to the other dove of the pair, and Hx,y, one
that is connected to both doves. If 23"r"
7
8 and, assuming
that the hawks surrounding the pair of doves are not inter-
acting with any other doves !this gives the pair of doves a
maximum chance of survival", we have
GHx" Gx" GHx,y ,
where G% is the average payoff of player %.
Consequently, according to Eq. !1", x can infect Hx, and
Hx,y can infect x.
Let us now calculate for what values of r the probability
that x invades the site of at least one Hx is less than an Hx,y
infecting x. To do so, let us distinguish the case of the asyn-
chronous updating policy from the synchronous one.
A. Asynchronous dynamics
The probability that an Hx neighbor is chosen to be up-
dated and adopts strategy D is given by
!2"
where N is the size of the population, !!" the probability an
Hx hawk is chosen to be updated !among the N players", !!!"
the probability the chosen Hx hawk compares its payoff with
player x, and finally & is the function defined in Eq. !1".
The probability that x is chosen to be updated and is in-
fected by one of the Hx,y hawks is given by
!3"
where !!" is the probability x is chosen to be updated, !!!"
the probability it measures itself against an Hx,y neighbor,
and & the function defined by Eq. !1".
For a square lattice with a Moore neighborhood !$= 37 and
k¯=8", expressions !2" and !3" give us r! 4659 &0.78, whereas
FIG. 8. !Color online" Lattice: two possible configurations.
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Predicting	behaviour	with	
Game	Theory
• Are	there	(strictly)	dominant	strategies?
• Or	any	Nash	equilibria?
• If	there	are	many	Nash	equilibria	can	we	
predict	which	one	will	be	achieved	based	
on	higher	payoffs	or	focal	points?
• Are	there	pareto-optimal	pairs	of	
strategies?
– Are	Nash	equilibria	among	them?	A	binding	
agreement	would	be	required	if	not.
• Is	there	a	socially-optimal	pair	of	
strategies?
Lessons	learned
• Understanding	of	the	main	concepts	of	Game	
Theory.	Given	a	payoff	matrix	be	able	to	identify	
and	explain	best	responses,	dominant	
strategies,	equilibria,	focal	points,	pareto	
optimality,	social	optimality.
• Ability	to	explain	how	Game	Theory	can	apply	
to	specific	problems	in	social	networks	and	
outline	how.
• Easley,	D.	and	Kleinberg,	J.	Networks	Crowds	and	Markets.	Cambridge	University	Press,	2010.	
http://www.cs.cornell.edu/home/kleinber/networks-book (chapters	6	and	7)
